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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following are the constitutional and statutory provisions which are addressed in
this appeal:
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by finding Merlin's family cabin to be

entirely marital property? The appellant court will not disturb the trial court decision
concerning property divisions unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.
Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1993).
II.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to apportion to Merlin his

premarital interest in the cabin and award it to Merlin as separate property? The appellant
court will not disturb the trial court decision concerning property divisions unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App. 1991)
cert denied S36 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993).
III.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to charge the marital estate and

divide equally the costs of the appraisals used by the Court in determining property
values? The standard of review of the apportionment of costs is whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507,
512 (Utah App. 1988).
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IV.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying post trial motions to take

additional evidence on the monies received from the sale of the St. George
condominium? The denial of post trial motions is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. Katz v. Peirce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Louise filed her complaint for divorce on December 22, 1997. R. 1.

2.

Louise immediately sought a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to

Show Cause. R. 10.
3.

Both parties engaged in discovery in preparation for trial.

4.

A bench trial was held on October 8 and 9, 1998. R. 101.

5.

The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on October 20, 1998. R. 101-

6.

Various post trial motions were filed including a Motion to Assess Costs

108.

(R. 109) and a Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling and/or Reopen Trial to Take
Additional Testimony and Evidence.
7.

On or about February 13, 1999, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce. R. 132-149.
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
1.

The parties were married on October 21, 1969. TT. Vol. I, p. 1.
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2.

The parties separated on November 6, 1997. R.l

3.

The parties had no children together but each had children from a prior

marriage. R. 1-8.
4.

Prior to the marriage, Merlin was the record title owner of property at Bear

Lake on which he and his sons had constructed a cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 43 L. 5-8.
5.

The cabin remained in Merlin's name throughout the course of this

marriage and was regarded by he and his children by a prior marriage as a family owned
cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 198, L. 20-23.
6.

During the marriage, Merlin's adult sons began constructing an addition to

the cabin while Merlin was working in California. TT. Vol. II, p. 362 L. 20-21.
7.

Merlin helped work on the cabin on weekends when he was in town but his

sons did most of the work. TT. Vol II, P. 362.
8.

The addition increased the size of the cabin by one bedroom for each of his

two sons, one bedroom for Merlin and a garage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 18-19.
9.

The materials for the addition were paid for mostly by the two sons with

Merlin contributing approximately $5,000.00 in cash.
10.

Many of the materials used were scavenged and therefore the actual costs

of the material were minimal. Id_
11.

The value of the cabin at the time of the divorce was $119,000.00.

$50,000.00 for the land, $40,000.00 for the original A-Frame Cabin, and $29,000.00 for
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the addition. TT. Vol. I, p. 120, L. 1, TT. Vol. I, p.124, L.9-11 and TT. Vol. I p. 125 L.
19-21.
12.

The appraised value of the cabin was not challenged at the trial court and

no other evidence of the present value of the cabin or improvements was introduced.
See Record generally.
13.

The parties also owned a residence in Layton, Utah. TT. Vol. I, p. 132.

14.

The Layton home was purchased during the marriage. Id.

15.

The mortgage payments on the Layton home were made from marital

resources until approximately one year prior to the parties separation and divorce when
Merlin received a worker's compensation settlement which was used to pay off the
mortgage balance of $30,661.08. R. 135-138.
16.

At trial the Court found the entire value of the addition to be marital and

"negative extrapolitated" sua sponte without evidence the value of the cabin at the time
of the marriage.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by finding the value supplied by the two sons
in improving the cabin to be marital and by "negative extrapolating" a premarital value
without supporting evidence. The trial court should have awarded the entire cabin
property to Merlin as premarital property or at least segregated his contribution to the
value of the improvements and divided that as part of the marital estate. The trial court
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abused its discretion by failing to charge the marital estate with the costs of the appraisals
used by the Court in determining property values. The Court abused its discretion in
denying post trial motions to take additional evidence on the disposition of monies
received from the sale of the St. George condominium.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING
THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE BEAR LAKE
CABIN TO BE PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE.

The trial court abused its discretion in finding the appreciation in Merlin's
premarital family cabin to be marital property. The standard of review is that on appeal
the decision of the lower court will not be disturbed concerning property divisions unless
it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 66
(Utah App. 1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993). Because the portion of the
trial court's decision with respect to the cabin is an abuse of discretion, this Court must
reverse that portion of the decision.
The trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February
13,1999. R. 132-144. Finding of Fact No. 11, states the following:
II. One of the central issues in this case is whether certain property is marital or
non-marital and the valuation of such property. During the marriage, the parties
have maintained individual bank accounts. Some of the property has been titled in
both names and some in respondent's name only or in conjunction with third
parties. The court concludes that all income of each party whether in a joint
account or in separate accounts is marital property and should be accounted for as
such. Moreover, the same is true for property titled in one or both parties' names
7

and in property held in conjunction with third parties as the interests of the parties
may occur. On the other hand, property brought into the marriage unless the
exceptions cited in MORTENSEN v. MORTENSEN, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah
1988) apply. Following are the Court's findings as to valuation and status of the
marital estate:
A. Bear Lake Cabin with adjacent Lot: The respondent owned an AFrame cabin and 50 foot water front adjacent lot on the west shore of Bear
Lake at the time of the parties marriage. The lot was sold for $5,000.00 in
1971 to J. Gordon and Virjean Reynolds when the parties moved to Florida
for respondent's work. It was allegedly repurchased by respondent's four
children in 1974 for $20,000.00 although a deed was not signed by the
Reynolds until April 18, 1980 and not recorded until September 18, 1997.
The lot is considered to have a current value of $50,000.00. Improvements
have been made to the lot including fill dirt, sprinkler system, sod and
retaining wall. Most of the labor and costs were borne by respondent's
children and some by respondent. Petitioner made no contribution to the
adjacent lot. Therefore, the Court finds that the lot is non-marital property.
On the other hand, the cabin, which also has a 50 foot water front
frontage, has been in the name of the respondent since the marriage.
Moreover, the cabin has been significantly enlarged and remodeled. It has
been insured under both parties's name. Taxes and most of the cost
associated with the improvements have been paid from marital funds. The
remodel has been done by respondent with the aid of his two sons as quid
pro quo for respondent's assistance with their improvements of the adjacent
lot. Over the years, petitioner has taken care of the domestic chores
associated with the cabin and its lot while respondent has handled the
physical improvements and financial matters associated with the cabin.
The entire family has used both the cabin and adjacent lot for recreational
purposes. Household furnishings in the cabin have been contributed to by
both petitioner and respondent from premarital property. The court
therefore concludes that petitioner has contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, and protection of the cabin and its associated lot throughout
the 28 years of the marriage and thus it is marital property.
The court further concludes that the current value of the cabin is
$119,000.00. However, the amount should be decreased by its value at the
time of the marriage. Petitioner suggests that its original value should be
based on the valuation by the county for property tax purposes which is
$1,900.00. The court rejects this notion. Respondent argues that the value
at the time of the parties marriage is irrelevant. The Court also rejects this
argument. If the adjacent lot, which is the same size as the cabin lot was
8

worth $5,000.00 when initially sold and is now worth $50,000.00, then by
negative extrapolation, the cabin and its lot which is now worth
$119,000.00 would have been valued at approximately $12,000.00 at the
time of the parties marriage. And the Court so concludes. Therefore, the
marital property value of the cabin and its lot is $119,000.00 less
$12,000.00 of [sic] $107,000.00.
B. Residence: The residence is located in Layton, Utah was purchased
during the marriage and has a current value of $141,000.00. There is no
mortgage outstanding. The home is marital property although respondent
argues that he should receive a $30,661.00 credit against the home
representing moneys he paid to the mortgagee when the mortgage was paid
off. He claims the source of those funds came from a lump sum payment
for permanent partial impairment resulting from the industrial accident
heretofore referred to. Those funds are non-marital property to which
respondent is entitled leaving a balance of $110,339.00 as marital property.
R. 135-138.
The Court included the division of property in its conclusions of law wherein the
Court awarded to Merlin the Bear Lake Cabin and the marital residence to Louise. R.
141-142. Any adjustment for the personal injury non-marital portion of Merlin's interest
in the marital residence was somehow accounted for in the Court's alimony award. R.
142.
The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by finding that the Bear Lake
Cabin was mostly marital property. As noted in the Finding of Fact above, the trial court
found that the property was owned by Merlin prior to the parties marriage, that title was
held only in his name throughout the marriage and then ignored the only competent
expert testimony presented at the trial that the value of the improvements done to the
cabin was $29,000.00, only $5,000.00 of which had been paid for by Merlin, the balance
having been paid for by his two sons. R. 135-136. Despite, the court specifically finding
9

that all premarital property should be awarded to the party who brought it into the
marriage the Court ignored the evidence and invented an approach it referred to as
"negative extrapolation" to arrive at a premarital value. This novel approach is
inconsistent with the evidence and is an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
In Mortensen. the Court laid out exceptions to the general rule that separate
property, together with the appreciation thereof, should be awarded to the party who
brought the property into the marriage. Specifically, the Court in Mortensen, stated that
separate property may be considered marital property if "the other spouse has contributed
to the augmentation, improvement, or operation of the property or has significantly cared
for, protected or preserved it." Id^ at 306. Merlin believes that Louise's conduct does
not rise to the level of the exceptions set forth in Mortensen as a matter of law and
therefore the court abused its discretion.
Louise testified that she kept a few items of her personal property at the cabin at
Bear Lake and that some of her premarital property was used to furnish the cabin. Trial
Transcript, Vol. 1, 26 L. 5-8. Louise testified that Merlin owned the Bear Lake property
prior to the parties marriage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 5-8. Louise testified that at the
beginning of the marriage the cabin property was two separate lots upon one of which
was the A-Frame Cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 12-13. Louise testified that an addition was
made to the cabin after the parties marriage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 18-19. Louise testified
that she did not know how the addition was paid for. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, L. 7-9. Louise
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thereafter contradicted herself by stating that while she did not know where the money
came from she was sure it was marital. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, Line 10-12. Counsel for
Merlin objected to Louise counsel's attempt to rehabilitate her testimony by asking
leading questions on this point and also that she was attempting to impeach her prior
testimony that Louise did not know where the money came from which objection was
sustained. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, L. 13-17. Louise testified that the utility bills and taxes for
the cabin were paid out of household money. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, L. 18-24. Louise
testified that Merlin paid for some improvements to the cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 49, L. 1921. The cabin was titled throughout the marriage in the name of Merlin and LaVonne
Symes, with LaVonne being Merlin's first wife. TT. Vol. I, p. 53, L. 3-5. Louise
testified that during the marriage when the parties went to the cabin she cooked the
meals, washed the dishes, cleaned, weeded, planted flowers. TT. Vol. I, p. 56, Line 5-11.
On cross examination, Louise testified that she had not been to the cabin since
1996. TT. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 1-2. Louise testified that title to the cabin and lot had never
been in her name. TT. Vol. I, p. 198, L. 20-23. Louise did not know where the money
came from to repurchase the lot at Bear Lake which had been earlier sold. TT. Vol. I, p.
205, L. 9-11.
In contrast to Louise testimony about her alleged contributions to the Cabin and
Lot, Merlin testified that the cost of the addition to the cabin was borne largely by his
adult sons. TT. Vol. II, p. 362, L. 20-21. Merlin testified that Louise never showed any
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interest in the Bear Lake property. TT. Vol. II, p. 363, L. 19-21. Merlin testified that
most of the improvements to the cabin were done by the boys using salvage materials and
that he contributed not more than $5,000.00 including the carpeting. TT. Vol. II, page
408, L.5-19. The real estate appraiser testified that the present market value of all of the
improvements provided by Merlin and his two sons was $29,000.00. TT. Vol. I, page
124, L.9-11.
Merlin believes that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that any
portion of the Bear Lake Property was marital. It is a standard rule of construction that
words are to be given their plain meaning. In the present case, Louise's own testimony is
that she did nothing to augment the value of the property other than to lend some of her
premarital property to furnishing the cabin (which she received back in the distribution of
personal property) and the performance of routine chores while visiting the property.
Louise did not make any improvements to the property nor did she contribute to the
operation of the property. Louise did not significantly care for the property. She did not
protect the property nor did she preserve the property. Rather, when Louise and the
family used the property, she cooked and cleaned for them and did some chores which
were related to the care of the people but not involved in the improvement of the
property. This is not legally sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Mortensen. As
such, the Court erred in determining that any portion of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot
were marital property. The Bear Lake Cabin and Lot should be awarded to Merlin, free
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and clear of any interest in Louise.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
APPORTION TO MERLIN THE PREMARITAL VALUE OF THE
CABIN AND THE APPRECIATION THEREOF.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to apportion to Merlin his premarital
interest in the cabin and awarding it to Merlin as separate property. The appellant court
will not disturb the trial court decision concerning property divisions unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App.
1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993). Because the decision is an abuse of
discretion, this Court should reverse the lower court's decision.
Willard Peterson, a real estate appraiser specializing in appraisals of property
surrounding Bear Lake testified as to the value of the property including the cabin. Mr.
Peterson testified that he performed an appraisal and the value of the property and cabin
and that the value of the property was $119,000.00. TT. Vol. I, p. 120, Line 1. Mr.
Peterson stated that the addition to the cabin constructed by Merlin and his sons added
very little additional value to the cabin because it was not professionally done. TT. Vol.
I, p. 120, L. 14-17. Mr. Peterson stated that the value of the addition was $29,000.00.
TT. Vol. I, p. 124, L. 9-11. Mr. Peterson testified that the A-Frame Cabin had a present
value of $40,000.00. TT. Vol. I, p. 124, L. 6-8. Mr. Peterson testified that the Lot had a
present value of $50,000.00. TT. Vol. I,, p. 125, L. 19-21. Mr. Peterson testified that he
was paid $275.00 to perform the appraisal. TT Vol. I, p. 122, L. 15. Merlin properly
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maintains that the A-Frame Cabin, and the Lot are his separate property, were never
marital in nature or commingled assets and that he should have been awarded them free
and clear of any interest in Louise. Merlin contributed $5,000.00 towards the
improvements done to the cabin during the marriage the total of which were valued
altogether at $29,000.00. The adult sons contributed most of the labor and materials to
build the addition and regarded this as their ownership interest. The Court ignored the
contributions of the two sons and found that their contributions were somehow a quid
pro quo for their interest in the second adjoining lot even though there was no evidence
to that effect presented at trial and the children testified that they purchased the lot
without any assistance from Merlin.
It is the rule of law in this state that premarital property, together with the
appreciation thereof, should normally be awarded to the party who brought that property
into the marriage. See Mortensen: See Also Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah
1987): Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988): Watson v. Watson,
837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991);
and Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah App. 1990). As stated above, Merlin
does not believe that the exceptions to this Rule apply as previously argued.
The Court did in fact provide Merlin with some credit for the premarital value of
the property. However, this value did not include any appreciation on that premarital
interest. Specifically, the Court awarded to Merlin a premarital interest in the property in
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the amount of $12,000.00. The balance of the value was considered marital property.
This is a clear abuse of discretion. See cases cited in previous paragraph. There was
specific testimony from Willard Peterson who stated the aggregate value of the property
was $119,000.00. Further, Mr. Peterson stated that the value of the improvement to the
Cabin was $29,000.00. Therefore, all of the balance of the value of the Bear Lake Cabin
and Lot was premarital value and appreciation thereon, in the amount of $90,000.00. It
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award a value greater than Merlin's share
of the contributions to the $29,000.00 addition as marital property.
In light of the Court's error in its treatment of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot, it was
additional error to award Louise the marital residence in Layton. Louise testified that the
value of the marital residence was $141,000.00 TT V. I, p. 41, L. 13. Derek Lamb, a
professional real estate appraiser valued the Layton residence at $141,500.00. TT. Vol. I,
p. 132, L. 2. Specifically, the Court found that the Layton residence was valued at
$141,000.00. The Court found that Merlin made a separate property contribution of
$30,661.00 which was subtracted from the value. The Court found that Merlin failed to
account for the proceeds of the sale of a condominium in St. George and included the
unexplained money as a marital asset subject to division even though Merlin testified that
he spent all the money supporting Louise and had no money left. The Court thereafter
found a value for the Layton residence at the appraised value less Merlin's separate
property plus Louise's portion of the proceeds of the condominium sale at $120,674.00.
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This asset was awarded to Louise to offset the award of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot to
Merlin. Merlin's position is that only the value of his contribution to the improvement of
the cabin should be marital. Assuming that the actual marital value of the Bear Lake
Property was 1/3 of the $29,000.00 improvements (which is larger than the $5,000.00
Merlin testified was his actual contribution), the Court should have awarded Louise one
half of that amount, or only $4,833.33 as her interest in the cabin. Merlin's one half
interest in the value of the Layton residence was $60,337.00. Louise's interest in the
Bear Lake Cabin should have been offset against Merlin's interest in the Layton property
leaving Merlin a lien against the Layton residence in the amount of $55,503.00. It was a
clear abuse of discretion to do otherwise. The Court should reverse that decision and
award Merlin a lien on the residence of that amount in addition to the cabin as his
separate property.
Alternatively, this Court should adopt a formula for addressing the division of real
property in all divorce cases in which there are separate property interests. This concept
was set forth in Judge Michael D. Lyon's article in the Utah Bar Journal, entitled, The
Source of Funds Rule-Equitably Classifying Separate and Marital Property, which set
forth a formula approach to the division of both marital and non-marital assets based on
the treatise by Brett R. Turner, entitled Equitable Distribution of Property. Judge Lyon's
article (a copy of which is attached) sets forth an easily followed explanation of this
theory, is well reasoned, and equitable. Pursuant to the theory, called the "Source of
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Funds Rule" the initial steps are to determine how and when the property was acquired,
give credit for contributions made at the time of acquisition from separate property and
throughout the marriage from both separate and marital property and allow appreciation
to be accrued on all contributions until you arrive at the present value.
Under the source of funds rule, property may be separate, marital or mixed. For
instance, in the present case, the property is both marital and mixed because of the lump
sum contribution made to the Lay ton residence and Merlin's premarital ownership of the
Bear Lake Cabin and Lot. Under this rule, uniform, easy to follow formula's are used to
determine: 1) value or net equity (separate contributions + marital contributions +
appreciation); 2) marital interest [present value(marital contributions/total
contributions)]; 3) separate interest [present value(separate contributions/total
contributions)]; 4) separate contributions (FMV at time of marriage -mortgage at time of
marriage); and 5) marital contributions (mortgage at time of marriage -mortgage at time
of divorce). Using these simple formulas the trial court can plug in numbers which are
available to it at trial to effectuate a consistent equitable result in all divorce cases and
eliminate the need for the court to "negative extrapolate". This approach is consistent
with all of the principles of equitable distribution which have been adopted by this Court
in the past and would provide a more uniform standard for trial judges and trial counsel
to apply in the future. It is similar in approach to the Woodward formula adopted by the
Court to divide retirement and pension benefits and would provide the same type of
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overall benefit and direction to the judiciary.
Applying the above stated formulas to the numbers in the present case would
reach an equitable result which would recognize Merlin's separate property and the
appreciation thereon as his property as well as fairly divide the parties marital
contributions and the appreciation thereon equally. Merlin urges this Court to adopt the
set of formulas set forth in the Source of Funds Rules as a method of standardizing the
achievement of equitable distribution of separate and mixed property in this state and to
remand to the trial court this case with instructions to do so. Doing so will provide a
greater degree of certainty for both trial counsel and the bench and a more uniform
application of the law throughout the State.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
DIVIDE THE COSTS OF VALUING PROPERTY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to charge the marital estate and
divide the costs of the appraisals used by the Court in determining property values. The
standard of review of the apportionment of costs is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah
App. 1988). Because the trial court abused its discretion, this Court should reverse that
portion of the decision.
Merlin believes the trial court erred in ordering him to shoulder all of the burden
associated with the costs of the appraisals which were relied upon by the Court in
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determining values for certain property. It is undisputed that the trial court has the
discretion to award costs in divorce proceedings. Merlin recognizes that pursuant to
current Utah case law, appraisal and accounting fees which are incurred in preparation
for a divorce trial are not necessarily taxed as costs. Morgan v. Morgan,795 P.2d 684
(Utah App. 1990). However, Merlin believes that in instances such as the present case,
where the Court accepts the appraised value as evidence, it is the only evidence used to
fix value, and the Court then divides equally the entire marital estate. It is inequitable that
one party should bear the entire responsibility for producing that appraisal. Dividing
equally that cost is consistent with the Courts equal division of all assets and would
promote equitable distribution rather than requiring one party to bear all of the costs.
The Court made no special findings on why it forced Merlin to bear all of these costs
while at the same time purporting to equalize everything else. It was error to do so.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
POST TRIAL MOTIONS FOR THE TAKING OF ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE.

The court abused its discretion in denying post trial motions to take additional
evidence on the monies received from the sale of the St. George condominium and the
value of the cabin at the time of the marriage. The denial of post trial motions is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Katz v. Peirce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah
1986). Merlin filed a motion for reconsideration or alternatively to reopen the divorce
proceeding to take additional evidence. This Motion was denied by the trial court.
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Merlin believes it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his motion when
said motion was timely filed and revealed to the Court the fact that additional evidence
which was material to the Court's proper determination of the issues was available, could
not have been presented at trial, and could materially affect the Court's ruling. This is
especially true where the motion for reconsideration was filed before the entry of a final
decree of divorce in this proceeding. The gravamen of Merlin's position is that nothing
in the pre-trial discovery or pleadings could have alerted him or his attorney to the fact
that money received and spent two years prior to the parties' separation would be an
issue at trial and redistributed absent proof that it was spent for marital purposes. The
Court should have recognized this from the pleadings and the pre-trial order and allowed
Merlin an opportunity to present evidence he could not have anticipated would be needed
at trial, especially where the records needed to do so were wholly in the control of the
Petitioner since the parties separation and were not made available to Merlin prior to
trial.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in its decision that the cabin and lot at Bear
Lake were marital property. Even assuming that it was in part marital property, it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail to award to Merlin the reasonable premarital
value of such property together with the appreciation thereon. This Court should adopt
the source of funds rule as a formulaic method of dealing with real property values in the
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context of a divorce proceeding. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Merlin's
post trial motion for reconsideration or alternatively to reopen the trial for additional
evidence. This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court.
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APPENDIX

UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification
Utah Code § 30-3-5
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§

30-3-5. Disposition of propertyMaintenance and health care of parties
and children-Division of debts-Court
to
have
continuing
jurisdictionCustody and visitation-Determination
of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for
modification

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating to
the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in
every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent
children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is
responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted
or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities
and regarding the parties' separate, current

Pagel

addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these
orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery
Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order
determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child
care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent
children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent. If the court
determines that the circumstances are appropriate
and that the dependent children would be
adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child
care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial
parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of
parents, grandparents, and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the
need for peace officer enforcement, the court may
include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court
ordered visitation schedule entered under this
chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody
or visitation provisions of a court order is made
and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to
pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the
prevailing party in that action, if the court
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UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification
determines that the petition was without merit and
not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition
alleges
substantial
noncompliance with a visitation order by a parent,
a grandparent, or other member of the immediate
family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a
visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party
costs, including actual attorney fees and court
costs incurred by the prevailing party because of
the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation.
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the
following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the
parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to
the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial.
In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage,
the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves
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on the threshold of a major change in the income
of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts
of both, that change shall be considered in
dividing the marital property and in determining
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the
court may make a compensating adjustment in
dividing the marital property and awarding
alimony.
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time of
the marriage.
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the
time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a
new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper
conduct justifies
that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the marriage
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of
alimony,
the
court
finds
extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony
for a longer period of time.
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UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment
of alimony shall resume if the party paying
alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the
former spouse is cohabitating with another
person.
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Amended by Laws 1994, c. 284; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff.
May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff July 1, 1997.

HISTORICAL NOTES
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c. 330 provides:
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in any
way to condone such a relationship for any purpose."

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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Views from the Bench

The Source of Funds Rule - Equitably Classifying
Separate and Marital Property
byJudgp Michael D. Lyon

JVXost district court judges and family law lawyers have handled a case similar to the following example: Wife has a house
with a mortgage when the parties are married; the title stays in
her name and the parties pay on the mortgage with marital
funds. How, then, at the time of the divorce is the equity or value
in the house divided? More specifically, how is Wife's separate
interest protected while assuring that the marital contribution to
the value of the home is respected? The salient objective of this
article is to share with the bar and bench the source of funds
rule, a tool which provides an equitable and systematic method
of classifying separate and marital property.'
1. UTAH LAW ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
The analysis of a property division incident to a divorce begins
with section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, which ostensibly gives a
trial court broad power to equitably divide all property owned
by the parties, regardless of when or how it was acquired:
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations, and partes." U.CX § 30-3-5 (1997). Indeed,
facially it creates an ailproperty system namely, that all property owned by the parties may be equitably apportioned
between them, regardless of ownership or whenever acquired.
Historically, the Utah Supreme Coun was reluctant to go beyond
the broad language of the statute and provide hard and fast
rules for property division, holding instead that a grant of broad
discretion to the trial coun would better ensure an equitable
result. Consequently; the Utah high court found no abuse of
discretion when premarital property, or separate gifts and
inheritance, were liberally divided between the divorcing partes.SeeNewmeyerv. fiewmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987);
BusbeU v. Busbell, 649 P2d 85 (Utah 1982); Dubois v.
Dubois, 504 R2d 1380 (1973). likewise, it affirmed trial
courts on the other end of the spectrum who concluded that
each party should, in general, receive the real and personal

property he or she brought into the marriage. See Preston v.
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes v. Georgettes,
627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981) Jesperson v.Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah 1980); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 R2d 193 (Utah
1974).
In the past decade our appellate courts have recognized the
value of adopting and consistently applying some general rules
and have created an analytical framework for the treatment and
division of separate and marital property. In Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), Justice Howe articulated
what has become the general rule in the division of separate or
inherited property.
[Tlrial courts making "equitable" property division
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with
the rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and with
the division made in many of our own cases, generally
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in
exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the
Judge Michael D. Lyon was appointed to
the Second District Court in July 1992 by
Governor Norman H. Bangerter. He
serves as chair of the Board of District
Judges and be recently served as presidingjudgp of the Second District Court.
He is a member andpast president of
RexE. lee American Inn of Court. Prior
to hisjudicial appointment, he practiced in general litigation
with the lawJim of Lyon, Helgesen, Waterfall &Jones in
Ogden, UtahJudge Lyon receivedhisB.S. degree, cum laude,
from Weber State College and bisJD, degreefrom the University of Utah College of law in 197L His is married and the
father of six children.
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other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection
of thai property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in
it, or (2> the property has been consumed or its identity
lost through commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to
the other spouse.
Id at 308 (citations omitted).

2. THE SOURCE OF FUNDS RULE
A. Importance of Equitable Classification
This current emphasis on property classification highlights a
hole in Utah case law. Although Utah law is nowfairlydear as to
the analysis a trial court and litigants must follow once property
has been classified, there have not been any Utah cases that
have clearly defined bow to determine if an asset is marital or
separate property. The source of funds rule therefore fits
cleanly and logically into the backdrop of existing Utah law
because it is purely a rule of classification that provides a definition of marital property. Indeed, as discussed in more detail
below, although Utah has not formally adopted the source of
funds as a method of classification, many Utah cases apply
source of funds principles. I recommend to the reader Brett R
Turner's treatise, Equitable Distribution of Property, from
which came many of the ideas and formulas used in this article.

Mortensen is a seminal decision because it not only provides a
more definite statement upon which practitioners and trial
courts can rely, it shifts the analysis in Utah from an all property
system to a modified dual classification system, where property is first categorized as either separate or marital and then,
presumptively; die separate property is given to the owner
spouse and the marital property is divided equitably. The presumption thai separate property is given to the owner spouse
Classification of property as either separate or marital must
may be rebutted, however, if there are just and equitable reafocus on when and how the property was acquired The theory
sons to do otherwise. Thus, the dual classification system that is
of the source of funds rule begins with die premise that propabsolute in some states is a modified system in Utah because
erty is acquired by the parties when its
equity might require the trial court to
"Classification of property as real economic value is created For
invade separate property in fashioning
either separate or marital must example, a party may hold legal tide to a
an equitable result
house upon purchase, but will actually
focus on when and how the
Since Mortensen, apparently in the
only "acquire" equity in the property as
property was acquired."
interest of promoting more predictabilthe mortgage is reduced or paid off.
ity and encouraging more consistent results, the Utah Court of
Thus, in the opening example, although Wife holds tide to the
Appeals has restricted a trial court's ability to divide separate
house upon marriage, if die actual value of the home is created
property between the parties to situaUons involving "extraordiduring the marriage through marital mortgage payments, the
nary circumstances;' Burt v. Burt, 799 R2d 1166 (Utah App.
source of hinds rule would define the home as marital property
1990), or 'linique circumstances," Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d because its value was acquired during the marriage.
64 (Utah App. 1991). The court of appeals has been more
The above example also illustrates that die acquisition of an
proactive in monitoring the trial court's divisions, emphasizing
asset may be a continuing process of making payments for the
that property division should be done in a "fair, systematic
fashion." Hall a Hall, 858P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). Specifi- acquired property and, at die time of the divorce, there may be
both a separate and a marital component in the value of the
cally, the court of appeals requires detailed findings as to the
property. (This example is not to be confused with a situation
classification of property before it is divided. See Haumont v.
where a separate asset has been commingled with marital assets
Haumont, 793 R2d 421 (Utah App. 1990) (remanded for
or has been gifted to the marital estate such that die asset has
findings as to die source of the disputed properties); Rappteye
lost its separate classification. When a separate asset is comv. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993) (similar result);
mingled, it should be classified as marital property and divided
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) (similar result).
between the parties. Mortensen, 760 E2d at 308.) Consider
Thus, it is critical for trial courts and lawyers representing
these further details to the above example: Wife owns a house
divorcing litigants to be conversant with a consistent approach
with
a fair market value of $ 100,000 at the time of the marriage
for classifying and dividing separate property.
and at that time die house carries an $80,000 mortgage. The
house remains in her separate name and the parties use marital
funds to pay down the mortgage. At the time of die divorce, the

WlOO?

03/25/99

THLF 15:02 FAI 801 531 0660

fair market value is still $100,000 but the mortgage is now
$60,000. A trial court using the source of funds approach
would classify $20,000 of the $40,000 of acquired value in the
home as separate property and the remaining $20,000 as martttl property.
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should be adopted, and yet litigants routinely bypass a more
complicated analysis by simply backing out the separate interest, giving it to the owner spouse, and then dividing die
remaining property equally.

The facts and outcome olHaUv. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah
Obviously, a practitioner or a trial judge will rarely be faced
App. 1993)) Illustrate the inequities of this routine approach. In
with dividing property that has not either appreciated or depreHall, the trial court found that the wife had contributed $21,000
dated in value. Typically, the trial judge and the litigants are
into a marital home, and so it divided the equity in the home
faced with the difficult proposition of classifying appreciation
equally and then took $21,000 out of the husband's marital
caused by forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation
share and gave it to the wife. The court of appeals held thai, in
or market forces* I have found in several cases J have decided,
order for an allocation of property to be done in "a fair, systemthat it is in these situations thai the source of funds rule and
atic fashion;1 the trial court should first classify property as
accompanying formulas are most helpful. The source of funds
separate or marital, then award the wife her separate contriburule dictates that this kind of appreciation bfc given the same
tion (absent "extraordinary circumstances"), and then divide
character as the underlying asset Accordingly, if the asset has
the marital equity in the home equally between the parties.
been acquired by separate funds, all of the appreciation is
Following these instructions, if the trial court found no extraorseparate, likewise, if the asset has been acquired with separate
dinary circumstances on remand, the wife's initial investment of
and marital funds, which is the typical situation, the apprecia$21,000 was returned to her without a proportionate share of
tion is allocated between the marital
When a separate interest in
* e tot€rest Hcr m>m invesunenl m
and separate estates proportionally.
the home was therefore treated as an
Brett R. TUrner, Equitable Distribution
property is simply returned at interest-free loan to the marriage. Mr.
of Property 163 (2d ed. 1994). Giving
the end ofa marriage without TUrner, in commenting on ditHall case,
appreciation the same classification as
any attributable interest, the points out that had the value of the
the asset that produced the appreciation
property has inequitably been home dropped, it would clearly have
is supported by a line of Utah cases. See
been improperforthe court to reimMortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (holding
used as an interest-free loan."
burse petitionerforher separate
that separate property should be awarded to the owner spouse
contributions, leaving the marital estate to bear the entire loss.
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value");
"If the separate estate must share the loss, however, it is only
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990)(affirming
fair to allow it to share the gain. When marital and separate
award to plaintiff of retirement benefits accumulated prior to
contributions are made to a single asset, the respective marital
marriage, together with all interest attributable to those premarand separate interests should be treated as percentages and not
ital contributions); Preston u. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah
as absolute amounts." Turner, supra, at 388, app. A.
1982) (remanding to the trial court for an award to defendant
of separate property together with the proportion of appreciaI believe that given the court of appeals' preferencefora systion in value attributable thereto).
tematic, fair approach, had the wife objected to the trial court's
failure to provide more than mere reimbursement of the sepaAlthough allocating appreciation proportionally may force
rate investment, the court of appeals would have approved
members of the bar and bench from their comfort zones to
awarding the wife a proportionate share of the interest Howperform mathematical exercises, 1 believe failure to award a
ever, since the parties did not raise the amount of
litigant who has separate funds in an asset a proportionate
reimbursement on appeal, the court of appeals appropriately
share of the appreciation of the asset is not only inequitable, but
did not address the issue. Clearly, then, to ensure that a spouse's
constitutes plain error. When a separate interest in property is
separate property is fully and equitably restored with a proporsimply returned at the end of a marriage without any attributtionate share of the interest, it is essential for practitioners and
able interest, the property has inequitably been used as an
trial court judges to understand and consistently apply the
interest-free loan. Absent compelling equitable reasons to the
sometimes difficult source of funds formulas.2
contrary, no one could argue persuasively that this approach
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B. Hie Source of Funds Formulas
As stated above, when a property's appreciation is caused by
forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation or market
forces, the appreciation should be given the same classification
as the underlying property. If, therefore, the parties have contributed to the property $10,000 in separate funds and $20,000
in marital funds, the appreciation should be classified proportionally, or one-third as separate and two-thirds as marital. In
Mr. Turner's mathematical formulas, this translates as follows:
Value (or net equity) = separate contributions + marital
contributions + appreciation
Marital interest« value(marital contributions/total
contributions)
Separate interest = value(separate contributions/total
contributions)
Application of the formula is clearer through use of our example, with additional details: Wife owns a house with a fair
market value of $ 100,000 at the time of the marriage and at the
time of the marriage the house carries an $80,000 mortgage.
The bouse remains in her separate name and the parties use
marital funds to pay down the mortgage. At the time of the
divorce, the fair market value has increased to $160,000, due to
market forces, and the mortgage is now $40,000. The numbers
would plug into the formulas as follows:
Value (or net equity) * separate contributions + marital
contributions + appreciation
separate contributions = FMV at marriage - mortgage
at marriage
= $100,000 - $80,000 * $20,000
marital contributions = Mortgage at marriage mortgage at divorce
= $80,000 - $40,000 * $40,000
Value « $20,000 + $40,000 + $60,000 = $120,000 in
net equity
separate interest = value(sep. contribution/total
contribution)
separate interest = $120,000($20,000/$60,000)
= $40,000
marital interest = value(mar. contribution/total
contribution)
marital interest = $120,000($40,00Q/$60,000)
= $80,000
Therefore, under the source of funds rule, the $ 120,000 of
equity is classified $40,000 as Wife's separate interest and
$80,000 as marital interest. Wife would therefore be entitled,

absent extraordinary circumstances, to $80,000 in equity
($40,000 separate interest plus one-half of the marital interest).
She receives back her separate contribution of $20,000 plus the
portion of appreciation that is attributable thereto; she receives
a return on her investment. Typically, if the court determines a
division of property should be consistent with this classification,
the home is either sold or awarded to the owner spouse, who
also assumes responsibilityforthe mortgage payments and
must pay her former spouse his equity. In our example, Wife
would receive the home, worth $160,000, assume payments on
the $40,000 mortgage, and be forced to buy out Husband's
$40,000 of equity. Thus, even though she is awarded the home,
she receives no more than her share of the equity.
The above example assumes all of the appreciation on the home
is a result of market forces or inflation. When, however, appreciation results from specific contributions of marital funds or
efforts, die resulting appreciation assumes the character of the
funds or efforts. TUrner, supra, at 162. This classification of
appreciation from capital improvements is in accordance with
Utah case law that when a spouse has by his or her efforts and
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of the property, he or she has acquired an equitable
interest in xlMortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.
To illustrate how a court could classify appreciation that may be
in part due to capital improvements, assume thisfinalvariation
of my example: Wife owns a house with a fair market value of
$100,000 and an $80,000 mortgage at the time of the marriage.
The house remains in her separate name, and the parties pay
down the mortgage using marital funds and, using $20,000 of
marital funds, finish off the basement At the time of die divorce,
the box market value of the house has increased to $ 160,000
and die mortgage Is $40,000.1 believe that the most equitable
approach is to add the value of the marital funds expended on
the home, or $20,000, to the amount of marital contributions
and the amount of total contributions, as shown below:
Value (or net equity) « separate contributions + marital
contributions + appreciation
separate contributions » FMV at marriage - mortgage
at marriage
= $100,000 - $80,000 = $20,000
marital contributions « [Mortgage at marriage - mortgage at divorce] + marital funds
spent on capital improvements
= ($80,000 - $40,0001 • $20,000
= $60,000
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Value « $20,000 + $60,000 + $40,000 = $120,000 in
net equity
separate interest = value(sep. contribution/total
contribution)
separate interest = $120,000($20 t 000/$80,000)
= $30,000
marital interest = value(mar. contribution/total
contribution)
marital interest - $120,000($60 ; 000/$80 J 000)
= $90,000
Therefore Wife would be entitled (absent extraordinary equitable circumstances) to $30,000 as a separate interest in the
home and the $90,000 marital interest would be divided equally
between the parties.5 It should be noted that there may be times
when evidence is presented as to the amount of appreciation
directly resulting from the improvement. When a trial court is
presented with this kind of evidence, it seems equitable thai the
appreciation resulting directly from die capital improvement be
backed out of the total appreciation and classified as marital.
The remaining appreciation should then be apportioned
between the separate and marital contributions using the formulas and, because the appreciation due to the capital
improvement has already been allocated, the marital funds
spent on the capital improvement should not be included in
either the numerator (marital contributions) or the denominator (total contributions) of the working fractions.
C. Evidence
As is illustrated by Hall, appellate courts cannot rule on the
appropriateness of allocating appreciation proportionally
through the source of funds rule without detailedfindingsfrom
the trial court judge. Similarly a trial court cannot properly
apply the source of funds formulas if the litigants do not present
detailed evidence as to the value of the property. To ensure
litigants do provide the necessary data, I use a pretrial order,
specifically advising the parties that the allocation of separate
property seems to be at issue, and that the parties should be
prepared to present evidence as to the following:
1. The home's Eur market value and mortgage amount at the
rime of the trial;
2. The amount of the parties' marital contribution to the
equity (or die amount the parties have paid on die mortgage during the marriage and, separately, any capital
contributions); and

3. The amount of the premarital equity interest in die home.4
3. CONCLUSION
David S. Dolowitz, in the April 1998 edition of the (/tab Bar
Journal, criticizes the appellate courts for, among other things,
being inconsistent and sometime inequitable in their treatment
of appreciation on separate property. David S. Dolowitz, The
Conundrum of Gifted, Inherited and Premarital Property in
Divorce, 11 Utah B.J. 3 at 16 (1998). His comments may well
indicate die growing level of frustration among members of die
bar who are left widiout definite, equitable guidance in this area.
I have found the source of funds rule to be practical in its direction as to the classification of separate and marital property, and
equitable in its result. By focusing the inquiry narrowly on die
value of the property and when that property was acquired and
by providing formulas that may be consistently applied, its
adoption would help eliminate some of the apparent frustration
among members of die bench and bar by providing clear direction, tiiereby fostering more negotiated setdements and
ensuring more uniform, equitable trial court decisions. Membets of die bench and bar should move beyond occasional
application of source of funds principles to wholesale adoption
of the source of funds rule. Mr, Turner notes that," le] quitable
distribution decisions defining die time at which property is
acquired Ml into two classes: diose which adopt the source of
funds rule, and those which avoid the issue." Ihrner, supra, at
354, app. A
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^•property" is not defined in ihe Utah Code- "Separate property" « used in thb article
includes all property either owned by one spouse prior to marriage, or received by t
s p o w individually by gift or inheritance during marriage.
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At least two other recent court of appeals' cases have load similar inequitabie results

Scbaumivrg R Scbmmberg. 875 F2d 596 (Utah App. 1994) (aftrrain* division of
appreciation on real property equally when separate hinds t*ed as down payment and
marital hinds used to augment the asset): Moon v. Moon, 790 P2d 52 (Utah App. 1990)
(afllnruni. division of value of marital home equally, after value of land given as separate
gift to husband Is backed out).
*There may be sttuattom, *uch as when a capHal lmpro*tnient b nwfc right before the
divorce, when it is more equitable to apply the scarce of funds formula annually, thus
distributing the yearly appreciation according to the contributions matk up to thai
point Other jurisdiction* applying the formulas have odd, however, that In the typfcal
case such an approach is unnecessarily time<oa5Uim^ai>d tedious 1urner,£^(ii(0Mr
Distribution o/Profmty (Supp. 1997).
*Ihls amount a n be readily ascertained by knowing the fair market value of the
property and the mortgage amount at the time of then»majje. Ifr^ctssary.aqualiSed
appraiser can extrapolate the fair market value of the ^ionK on the date of the marriage.
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BEAN & SMEDLEY
Emilie A. Bean (6178)
Attorney for Petitioner
190 South Fort Lane, #2
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 544-4221

IN TEE SECOND JUDICIAL

FEB

DISTRICT

COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY

FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE A. SYMES,
Petitioner,
vs.
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Respondent.

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 9747 02275

This matter came on regularly for trial on Thursday and
Friday, October 8 th and 9 th, 1998 at the Lay ton District Court, the
Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, presiding.

Petitioner was present and

represented by her attorney, Emilie A. Bean.
present and represented by Steven C. Tycksen.

Respondent was also
The Court having

heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses on behalf of
each party and received exhibits into evidence, and now being fully
informed in the premises, hereby enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both parties were residents of Davis County for more than

three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

The parties were married on the 21st day of October, 1970,

Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah.
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3.

No children have been born as issue of the marriage and

none are expected, however each party has children from a prior
marriage.
4.

Irreconcilable differences have recently developed causing

an irretrievably breakdown in the marriage relationship.

Those

difference include unilateral control of marital funds, verbal
abusef threats of physical assault directed toward petitioner by
respondent.

Respondent's past conduct has caused petitioner to be

fearful for her physical safety.

Consequently, the resolution of

the issues in this matter should be with an effort to eliminate any
legal obligations running in favor of either party if equity can
still be achieved.

The Court therefore concludes that petitioner

should be granted a Decree of Divorce from respondent with the same
to become final immediately upon entry.
5.

Petitioner is 62 years of age.

She receives Social

Security benefits in the sum of $390.00 per month.
other income.

Her health is poor.

She has no

She is receiving medical care

for abdominal, colon, bladder and heart problems.

It is

problematical as to whether she can be meaningfully employed
although she testified that most of her problems are stress related
and may abate somewhat following the divorce.

Monthly medication

costs currently approximate $300.00. She has worked during most of
the marriagef primarily for employers with whom her husband also
worked.

They have lived in Florida, Oregon, California and, for

the last 19 years, in Utah, due to respondent's employment.
6.

Petitioner's monthly expenses are as follows;
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Electricity
$
Gas
Telephone
Water and Garbage
Food
Clothing
Gas for Car
Car Repair
Medical (Medication)
Doctor (Not Paid by Ins.)
TOTAL

55,00
70.00
60.00
50.00
200.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
300.00
80.00

$1,035.00

which the Court finds reasonable in total but not necessarily/
reasonable as to each line item.
7.

Respondent is 67 years of age and also receives Social

Security benefits in the monthly sum of $893.00.
health.

He too is in ill

He was injured in an industrial accident resulting in a

closed head injury and suffered a hip fracture in a recent car
accident.

His employability is also problematical although he

testified that he may find a minimum wage job which he hopes to do
in the immediate future.
8.

Respondent is currently living with a son pursuant to a

Second District Court Order in the matter styled, THE STATE OF UTAH
vs. MERLIN SYMES, Case No. 971701418 (see respondent's Ex. #18).
It is unknown how long that arrangement will last.

However,

assuming he may be allowed to live on his own sometime in the
future, he estimates that his monthly expenses will be as follows:
Rent
Property Tax
Utilities
Repairs
Phone
Food
Clothing
Car Expense
Entertainment
Laundry

$

200.00
60.00
50.00
50.00
25.00
150.00
25.00
50.00
25.00
30.00

Insurance
Incidentals
Gifts

1*79.00
50.00
60.00

Medical

155.00

TOTAL

$1,089.00

which the Court finds reasonable in total but not reasonable
necessarily as to each line item.
9«

Petitioner is in need of income above her current

allotment.
10.

Respondent is also in need of more than his allotment.

There was no testimony as to indebtedness at trial except

as to medical bills.
11.

One of the central issues in this case is whether certain

property is marital or non-marital and the valuation of such
property.

During the marriage, the parties have maintained

individual bank accounts.

Some of the property has been titled in

both names and some in respondent's name only or in conjunction
with third parties. The Court concludes that all income of each
party whether in a joint account or in separate accounts is marital
property and should be accounted for as such.

Moreover, the same

is true for property titled in one or both of the parties' names
and in property held in conjunction with third parties as the
interests of the parties may occur.

On the other hand, property

brought into the marriage together with appreciation is non-marital
property and is to be returned to the party who brought it into the
marriage unless the exceptions cited in MORTENSEN vs. MORTENSEN,
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) apply.

Following are the Court's

findings as to valuation and status of the marital estate:
A.

Bear Lake Cabin with adjacent vacant Lot:

The
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respondent owned an A-frame cabin and a 50 foot water front
adjacent lot on the west shore of Bear Lake at the time of the
parties' marriage.

The lot was sold for $5,000.00 in 1971 to

J. Gordon and Virjean Reynolds when the parties moved to
Florida for respondent's work.

It was allegedly repurchased

by respondent's four children in 1974 for $20,000.00 although
a deed was not signed by the Reynolds until April 18, 1980 and
not recorded until September 18, 1997. The lot is considered
to have a current value of $50,000.00.

Improvements have been

made to the lot including fill dirt, sprinkler system, sod and
retaining wall. Most of the labor and costs were borne by
respondent's children and some by respondent.
no contribution to the adjacent lot.

Petitioner made

Therefore, the Court

finds that the lot is non-marital property.
On the other hand, the cabin, which also has a 50 foot
water front frontage, has been in the name of respondent since
the marriage.

Moreover, the cabin has been significantly

enlarged and remodeled.
parties' names.

It has been insured under both

Taxes and most of the cost associated with

the improvements have been paid from marital funds.

The

remodel has been done by respondent with the aid of his two
sons as a quid pro quo for respondent's assistance with their
improvements of the adjacent lot.

Over the years, petitioner

has taken care of the domestic chores associated with the
cabin and its lot while respondent has handled the physical
improvements and financial matters associated with the cabin.
The entire family has used both the cabin and the adjacent lot
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for recreational purposes.

Household furnishings in the cabin

have been contributed to by both petitioner and respondent
from pre-marital property.

The Court therefore concludes that

petitioner has contributed to the enhancement, maintenance,
and protection of the cabin and its associated lot throughout
the 28 years of the marriage and thus it is marital property.
The Court further concludes that the current value of the
cabin is $119,000.00.

However, that amount should be

decreased by its value at the time of the marriage.
Petitioner suggests that its original value should be based on
the valuation by the county for property tax purposes which is
$1,900.00.

The Court rejects that notion.

Respondent argues

that the value at the time of the marriage is irrelevant.
Court also rejects that argument.

The

If the adjacent lot, which

is the same size as the cabin lot was worth $5,000.00 when
initially sold to the Reynolds and is now worth $50,000.00,
then by negative extrapolation, the cabin and its lot which is
now worth $119,000.00 would have been valued at approximately
$12,000.00 at the time of the parties7 marriage.
Court so concludes.

And the

Therefore, the marital property value of

the cabin and its lot is $119,000.00 less $12,000.00 of
$107,000.00.
B.

Residence:

The residence located in Layton, Utah,

was purchased during the marriage and has a current value of
$141,000.00.

There is no mortgage outstanding.

The home is

marital property although respondent argues that he should
receive a $30,661.00 credit against the home representing
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moneys he paid to the mortgagee when the mortgage was paid
off.

He claims the source of those funds came from a lump sum

payment for permanent partial impairment resulting from the
industrial accident heretofore referred to.

Those funds are

non-marital property to which respondent is entitled leaving a
balance of $110,339.00 as marital property in the residence.
C.

Vehicles:

The following vehicles are marital

property worth the values as indicated:
1982 Zimmer
1946 Lincoln
1987 Marquis
Other miscellaneous cars,
Jet skis, snowmobiles, boat
3 sets Chrome Wheels

$21,000.00
3,000.00
Unknown
Unknown
1,600.00

The Zimmer was purchased by respondent for $24,500.00.
It was appraised at $15,000.00 or $16,000.00 without any road
testing or careful examination.
$21,000.00.

The low blue book is

The Court concludes that the blue book is the

best appraisal.
The vintage Lincoln is valued as a source of parts for
those who are restoring a like vehicle.

No valuation was

testified to concerning the Marquis which petitioner is now
driving and was a gift from her mother.
marital property.

It is therefore non-

The other miscellaneous vehicles are

considered to have only salvage value.
D.

Jewelry:

The following jewelry for each of the

parties is valued as follows:
Petitioner
$14,470.00
Respondent
10,845.00
Respondent claims that certain items of jewelry are
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missing but were in the parties7 residence when he was
arrested on the criminal charges now pending against him.

He

further asserts that he is entitled to a credit against the
marital estate on the grounds that petitioner has occupied the
home since that time and should be held responsible for the
missing items. Petitioner on the other hand claims that the
home has been burglarized and vandalized since respondent's
arrest.

She implies that either respondent or others under

his direction probably are the culprits and that the missing
items were taken then.

In the alternative, she speculates

that before the arrest respondent took many items from the
house and has them at some other location which may include
the missing jewelry items. Neither party has met their burden
of showing responsibility on the other as to the missing items
and therefore the court makes no ruling as to those items nor
considers them part of the marital estate.
E.

Doll Collection:

Petitioner has collected dolls

since she was a small child.

Dolls collected before the

marriage are non-marital property.
marriage are marital property.

Dolls collected after the

The value of the collection

after marriage is $8,000.00 and is part of the marital estate.
F.

Insurance:

The cash value of the following three

insurance policies issued by Alexander Hamilton Life are part
of the marital estate:
Policy #5094704
Policy #343673
Policy #1816086
G. Guns and ammunition:

$11,809.00
2,371.00
1,708.00
Respondent has acquired an
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assortment of hand guns and long barrel guns with a supply of
ammunition.

It has a value of $lf100.00 and is a part of the

marital estate.
H.

Cash:

Respondent recently withdrew $10,000.00 from

insurance policy No. 5094704 and deposited the same into a CD.
While the transaction may not be in violation of the letter of
paragraph 3C of the Order on Order to Show Cause issued by
this Court on February 20f 1998, it was inconsistent with the
spirit of the Order.

The Court does not know whether the

transaction resulted in the current cash value of the policy
to be less than it might otherwise have been.

In any event,

the funds in the CD are marital property together with any
accrued interest to date.
I.

St. George Property:

The parties acquired an

undivided one-half (h) interest in a piece of residential
property in St. George, Utah, which was recently sold.

The

buyer paid $34,716.00 to the parties on or about August 5,
1997, as part of that sale. All of the funds were put into
respondent's bank account.

$14,000.00 was divided between the

parties pursuant to this Court's Order on Order to Show Cause
issued February 20, 1997. The balance has not been accounted
for by respondent.

The funds are marital property.

Petitioner should therefore receive a credit in the amount of
$10,335.00 against the total marital estate before
distribution which is one-half (%) of the unaccounted for
balance.
J.

Household furnishings:

The Court is not going to
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value the household furnishings. There is no independent
testimony from an appraiser as to their value.
value the property would be mere speculation.

To attempt to
The Court does

not find the testimony of respondent as to their value
credible and therefore discounts the same. Neverthelessf each
parties7 suggested division is fairly consistent.

Pre-marital

property is to go to the party who brought the item into the
marriage.

The marital property is to be divided as

suggested.

Specifically, however, respondent is to receive

the jukebox.

If the parties cannot agree on a distribution as

to the balance, either may petition the Court for assistance
as to those items on which there is a dispute.
From the foregoing Findings of Factf the Court does hereby
enter the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject

matter in this action.
2.

Petitioner should be granted a divorce from respondent on

the ground of irreconcilable differences, and the divorce should
become final upon entry with the Clerk of the Court.
3.

The Court concludes that the following property

distribution is equitable and that each party should be granted the
following property as identified:
ITEM
Bear Lake Cabin
Residence:
Value - $141f000.00
Less 30,661.00

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT
$107,000.00
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Plus -

10,335.00
$120,674.00

1982 Zimmer

21,000.00

1946 Lincoln

3,000.00

Chrome Wheels & Misc.
Vehicles
Jewelry

1,600.00
14,470.00

Doll Collection

8,000.00

Insurance
Policy #343673
Policy #3094704

11,809.00

Policy #1816086

1,708.00

2,371.00

Cash (CD)

10,000.00

Guns & Ammunition
TOTAL
4.

10,845.00

1,100.00
$156,661.00

$156,916.00

Respondent's personal injury claim has been reduced from

the marital value of the residence and petitioner's share of the
unaccounted for proceeds from the sale of the St. George property
has been added for a net value of $120,674.00 leaving a sum of
$20,326.00 (30,661.00-10,335.00) to be adjusted in favor of
respondent.

That adjustment is accounted for with regard to

alimony mentioned below.
5.

Respondent's award of the guns and ammunition shall be

subject to the Order of Criminal Court or any subsequent
amendment•
6.

Due to the disparity in income, it is equitable that the

parties' incomes be equalized so that they are placed on an even
footing though that will still leave each short of meeting their
needs.

It may be that they will have to find some kind of
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employment or sell some of their assets in order to make do.

It is

equitable for respondent to pay petitioner alimony in the sum of
$251.00 per month.

That amount results from the average of the two

Social Security payments and adjusting the alimony so that the
income of each party is equal.

However, the Court concludes that

there should be no alimony obligation on the part of respondent the
result of which offsets respondent's right to receive payment for
the balance of his personal injury funds in the amount of
$20,326.00 which petitioner is taking as part of the equity in the
marital residence.
7.

Each of the parties are to be responsible for their own

indebtedness and to hold the other harmless thereon.

Each party is

responsible for his or her own medical bills.
8.

Petitioner may be restored to her maiden name if she

chooses to hereafter be known as A. LOUISE ADKINS.
9.

Each of the parties is to be responsible for their own

attorney's fees and costs of court.
10.

Each party is restrained from harassing, abusing or

threatening the other.

A police officer is to be present when

respondent's personal property currently stored at petitioner's
residence is picked up.

Respondent's designee is to remove all of

respondent's property at petitioner's residence within 30 days
following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in that respondent has
been ordered to stay away from petitioner's home in the Order of
the Criminal Court.
11.

Each of the parties is to cooperate in the execution of

any documents necessary to finalize all aspects of the Decree of
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Divorce to be
be issued
i s s u e d in
i n this
t h i s matter.
matter.
DATED this /^^ d a y_ of _ _
/^Jjff

, 199^

BY

N O T I C E
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney
for petitioner, will submit the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the Judge of the above-entitled
Court for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from
the date this Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that
time, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Rules of Judicial Administration.
Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

//,& day of ^Jm^f^J^

1998.

EMILIE A. BEAN
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this /&
day of ~2fs!A&»J*>^ 1998, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, 11519
Nicklaus Road, PO Box 480, Draper UT 84020-0480, postage prepaid.

BEAN & SMEDLEY
Emilie A. Bean (6178)
Attorney for Petitioner
190 South Fort Lane, #2
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 544-4221
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE A. SYMES,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Civil No. 9747 02275
Respondent.

This matter came on regularly for trial on Thursday and
Friday, October 8 th and 9 th, 1998 at the Lay ton District Court, the
Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, presiding.

Petitioner was present and

represented by her attorney, Emilie A. Bean.

Respondent was also

present and represented by Steven C. Tycksen.

The Court having

heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses on behalf of
each party and received exhibits into evidence, and now being fully
informed in the premises, and having heretofore made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby ORDER,
ADJUDGE AND DECREE:
1.

Petitioner is granted a divorce from respondent on the

ground of irreconcilable differences, and the and the bond of
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alimony mentioned below.
4.

The marital property is to be divided by the suggested

division of the parties.
receive the jukebox.

Specifically, however, respondent is to

If the parties cannot agree on a distribution

as to the balance, either may petition the Court for assistant as
to those items on which there is a dispute.

Par-marital property

is to go to the party who brought the item into the marriage.
5.

Respondent is awarded the guns and ammunition subject to

the Order of Criminal Court or any subsequent amendment.
6.

It is ordered that respondent pay to petitioner alimony in

the sum of $251.00 per month.

That amount results from the average

of the two Social Security payments and adjusting the alimony so
that the income of each party is equal.

However, the Court

concludes that there should be no alimony obligation on the part of
respondent the result of which offsets respondent's right to
receive payment for the balance of his personal injury funds in the
amount of $20,326.00 which petitioner is taking as part of the
equity in the marital residence.
7.

Each of the parties is responsible for their own

indebtedness and to hold the other harmless thereon.

Each party is

responsible for his or her own medical bills.
8.

Petitioner may be restored to her maiden name if she

chooses to hereafter be known as A. LOUISE ADKINS.
9.

Each of the parties is to pay his or her own attorney's

fees and costs of court.
10.

Each party is restrained from harassing, abusing or

threatening the other•

A police officer is to be present when
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i/ivORCE to the Judge of the above-entitled Court for his signature,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this /&& day o f - ^ ^ n X i ^ 1998, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce
to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, 11519 Nicklaus Road, PO Box
480, Draper UT 84020-0480, postage prepaid.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
F < If !I i Ill 11li" I ".Il rill1 I I [ • " [ ' A,, II-III I Ill I III!, 11,1' r ||-

LOUISE A . :'
Petitio T

' il I I I I l l

:
:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:
:
:

Case No. 974702275

vs.
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Respondent

Judge; DARWIN C. HANSEN

The above-entitled action came on for trial on the 8th and 9th days of October,
1998. Petitioner appeared personally and through her counsel Emiliie A Bear i
Respondent appeared personally and through his counsel Steven C. Tycksen. The
Court took the matter under advisement after hearing testimony and the arguments of
counsel. Based thereon, the Court now makes and enters its Memorandum Decision
as follows:
1
I! IRISDICTION: Both of the Parties have been residents of Davis County more
tl lai ni tl iree months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this action
2.
MARRIAGE STATIST,oo. . he Parties were mar i ied on the 21 st day of O c t o —
1970 in Salt Lake City, L Iti \\ I.
3.
C H I L U K L N : N O children have been bor
each party has children from a prior marriage.

«~ .—. ,

4.
GROIII Ill I!! III! reconcilable differences have recently developed causing an
irretrievable II ' H. ill Jown in the marriage relationship. Those differences include
unilateral control of marital funds, verbal abuse, threats and physical assault directed
toward Petitioner by Respondent. Respondent's past conduct has caused Petitioner to
be fearful for her physical safety. Consequently, the resolution of the issues in this
matter should be with an effort to eliminate any legal obligations running in favor of
either Party if equity can still be achieved. The Court therefore concludes that
Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from Respondent with the same IIi:
become final immediately i ipon entry
5.
PETITIONER'S INCOME AND EXPENSES: Petitioner is 82 years of age. She
receives Social Security Benefits in the sum of $390 per month. She has no other
income. Her health is poor. She is receiving medical care for abdominal, colon,
bladder and heart problems. It is problematical as to whether she can be meaningfully
employed although she testified that most of her problems are stress related and may
abate somewhat following the divorce. Monthly medication costs currently approximate
$300. She has worked during most of the marriage, primarily for employers with whom
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her husband also worked. They have lived in Florida, Oregon, California and, for the
last 19 years, in Utah, due to Respondent's employment.
Petitioner claims her monthly expenses are as follows:
Electricity
$ 55
Gas
70
Telephone
60
Water and Garbage
50
Food
200
Clothing
40
Gas for Car
60
Car Repair
80
Medical (medication)
300
Doctor (Not pd by ins)
80
TOTAL

$1035

which the Court finds reasonable in total but not necessarily reasonable as to each
line item.
6.
RESPONDENTS INCOME AND EXPENSES: Respondent is 67 years of age
and also receives Social Security Benefits in the monthly sum of $893. He too is in ill
health. He was injured in an industrial accident resulting in a closed head injury and
suffered a hip fracture in a recent car accident. His employability is also problematical
although he testified that he may find a minimum wage job which he hopes to do in the
immediate future.
Respondent is currently living with a son pursuant to a Second District Court
Order in the matter styled, THE STATE OF UTAH vs. MERLYN SYMES, Case No.
971701418 (see Respondent's Ex. #18). It is unknown how long that arrangement will
last. However, assuming he may be allowed to live on his own sometime in the future,
he estimates that his monthly expenses will be as follows:
Rent
Property Taxes
Utilities
Repairs
Phone
Food
Clothing
Car Expense
Entertainment
Laundry
Insurance
Incidentals

$ 200

60
50
50
25
150
25
50
25
30
179
50

3
Gifts
Medical

bU
155
THTAI

which \\)p f mi mi ( In i I
item.

I"PI I

$1,089
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7.
PROPERTY VALUATION AND STATUS: One of the central issues in this case
is whether certain property is marital or non-marital and the valuation of such property.
During the marriage, the Parties have maintained individual bank accounts. Some of
the property has been titled in both names and some in Respondent's name only or in
conjunction with third parties. The Court concludes that all income of each Party
whether in a joint account or in separate accounts is marital property and should be
accounted for as such. Moreover, the same is true for property titled in one or both of
the Parties' names and in property held in conjunction with third parties as the interests
of the Parties may occur. On the other hand, property brought into the marriage
together with appreciation is non-marital property and is to be returned to the Party who
brought it into the marriage unless the exceptions cited in MORTENSEN v
MORTENSEN, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) apply. Following are the Court's
findings as to valuation and status of the marital estate:
A.
Bear Lake Cabin with adjacent vacant Lot: The Respondent owned
an A^frame cabin and a 50 foot water front adjacent lot on the west shore of Bear Lake
at the time of the Parties' marriage. The lot was sold for $5000 in 1971 to J. Gordon
and Virjean Reynolds when the Parties moved to Florida for Respondent's work. It was
allegedly repurchased by Respondent's four children in 1974 for $20,000 although a
deed was not signed by the Reynolds until April 18, 1980 and not recorded until Sept.
18, 1097 The lot is considered to have a current value of $50,000. Improvements
have been made to the lot including fill dirt, sprinkler system, sod and retaining wall
Most of the labor and costs were born by Respondent's children and some by
Respondent. Petitioner made no contribution to the adjacent lot. Therefore, the coui I
linds that the lot is non-marital property.
On the other hand, the cabin, which also has a bU toot water front frontage,
has been in the name of Respondent since the marriage. Moreover, the cabin has
been significantly enlarged and remodeled. It has been insured under both Parties'
names. Taxes and most of the cost associated with the improvements have been paif I
from marital funds. The remodel has been done by Respondent with the aid of his two
sons as a quid pro quo for Respondent's assistance with their improvement of the
adjacent lot. Over the years, Petitioner has taken care of the domestic chores
associated with the cabin and its lot while Respondent has handled the physical
improvements and financial matters associated with the cabin. The entire family has
used both the cabin and the adjacent lot for recreational purposes. Household
furnishings in the cabin have been contributed to by both Petitioner and Responds il
from pre-marital property. The Court therefore concludes that Petitioner has
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contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, and protection of the cabin and its
associated lot throughout the 28 years of the marriage and thus it is marital property.
The Court further concludes that the current value of the cabin is $119,000.
However, that amount should be decreased by its value at the time of the marriage.
Petitioner suggests that its original value should be based on the valuation by the
county for property tax purposes which is $1900. The Court rejects that notion.
Respondent argues that the value at the time of the marriage is irrelevant. The Court
also rejects that argument. If the adjacent lot, which is the same size as the cabin lot,
was worth $5,000 when initially sold to the Reynolds and is now worth $50,000, then by
negative extrapolation the cabin and its lot which is now worth $119,000 would have
been valued at approximately $12,000 at the time of the Parties1 marriage. And the
Court so concludes. Therefore the marital property value of the cabin and its lot is
$119,000 less $12,000 or $107,000.
B. Residence: The residence located in Layton, Utah, was purchased
during the marriage and has a current value of $141,000. There is no mortgage
outstanding. The home is marital property although Respondent argues that he should
receive a $30,661 credit against the home representing monies he paid to the
mortgagee when the mortgage was paid off. He claims the source of those funds came
from a lump sum payment for permanent partial impairment resulting from the industrial
accident heretofore referred to. Those funds are non-marital property to which
Respondent is entitled leaving a balance of $110,339 as marital property in the
residence.
C. Vehicles: The following vehicles are marital property with the values
as indicated:
1982Zimmer
1946 Lincoln
1987 Marquis
Other miscellaneous
cars, jet skis, snowmobiles, boat
3 sets chrome
Wheels

$21,000
$ 3,000
unk

unk
$ 1600

The Zimmer was purchased by Respondent for $24,500. It was appraised at
$15,000 or $16,000 without any road testing or careful examination. The low blue book
is $21,000. The Court concludes that the blue book is the best appraisal.
The vintage Lincoln is valued as a source of parts for those who are restoring a
like vehicle. No valuation was testified to concerning the Marquis which Petitioner is
now driving and was a gift from her mother. It is therefore non- marital property. The
other miscellaneous vehicles are considered to have only salvage value.
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L. uewelry: The following \ewp\p for Or\r\\

t HIP Parties is valuprl as

follows:
"™ar

$14,470
$10,845

Respondent claims that certain items of jewelry are missing but were ii i the
Parties' residence when he was arrested on the criminal charges now pending against
him. He further asserts that he is entitled to a credit against the marital estate on the
grounds that Petitioner has occupied the home since that time and should be held
responsible for the missing items. Petitioner on the other hand claims that the home
has been burglarized and vandalized since Respondent's arrest. She implies that
either Respondent or others under his direction probably are the culprits and that the
missing items were taken then. In the alternative, she speculates that before the arrest
Respondent took many items from the house and has them at some other location
which may include the missing jewelry items. Neither Party has met their burden of
showing responsibility on the other as to the missing items and therefore the Court
makes no ruling as to those items nor considers them part of the marital estate.
E. Doll Collection: Petitioner has collected dolls since she was a small
child. Dolls collected before the marriage are non-marital property. Dolls collected after
the marriage are marital property. The value of the collection after marriage is $8,000
and is part of the marital estate.
p^ insurance: The cash value of the following three insurance poln. i s
issued by Alexander Hamilton I ife are part of the marital estate:
Policy # :.

11 ii|

Policy # 343673
Policy* 1816086

$11,809

$ 2,371
$ 1, 708

G. Guns and ammunition; Respondent has acquired an assortment of
hand guns and long barrel guns with a supply of ammuniti ::: i i It has a value of $1,100
and is a part of the marital estate
H. Cash; Respondent recently withdrew $10,000 from insurance policy
No. 5094704 and deposited the same into a CD. Wf tile tl le transaction may not be in
violation of the letter of paragraph 3C. of the Order on Order to Show Cause issued by
this Court on Feb. 20, 1998, it was inconsistent with the spirit of the Order. The Court
does not know whether the transaction resulted in the current cash value of the policy
to be less than it might otherwise have been. In any event, the funds in the CD are
marital property together with any accrued interest to date.
I St. George Property: The Parties acquired an undivided Vz interest in a
piece of residential property in St George, Utah, which was recently sold. The buyer
paid $34,716 to the Parties on or about Ai igust 5, 1997, as part of that sale. AH of the
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funds were put into Respondent's bank account. $14,000 was divided between the
Parties pursuant to this Court's Order on Order to Show Cause issued February 20,
1997. The balance has not been accounted for by Respondent. The funds are marital
property. Petitioner should therefore receive a credit in the amount of $10,335 against
the total marital estate before distribution which is 1/4 of the unaccounted for balance.
J. Household furnishings: The Court is not going to value the household
furnishings. There is no independent testimony from an appraiser as to their value. To
attempt to value the property would be mere speculation. The Court does not find the
testimony of Respondent as to their value credible and therefore discounts the same.
Nevertheless, each Parties' suggested division is fairly consistent. Pre-marital property
is to go to the Party who brought the item into the marriage. The marital property is to
be divided as suggested. Specifically, however, Respondent is to receive the jukebox.
!f the Parties cannot agree on a distribution as to the balance, either may petition the
Court for assistance as to those items on which there is a dispute.
8.
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: The Court concludes that the following property
distribution is equitable:
ITEM

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT
$107,000

Bear Lake Cabin
Residence:
Value-$141,000
Less - $ 30,661
Plus - $ 10.335
$120,674
"82" Zimmer

$ 21,000

"46" Lincoln

$

3,000

Chrome Wheels & Misc
vehicles

$

1,600

$

10,845

$

2,371

Jewelry

$ 14,470

Doll Collection

$

Insurance:
Policy # 343673
Policy # 5094704
Policy* 1816086
Cash (CD)

8,000

$ 11,809
$ 1,708

$ 10,000

7
Guns and Ammunition
™"rA'

*
$156,661

I.IUJ

$156,916

Respondent's personal injury claim has been reduced from the marital value of
the residence and Petitioner's share of the unaccounted for proceeds from the sale of
the St. George property has been added for a net value of $120,674 leaving a sum of
$20,326 (30,661-10,335) to be adjusted in favor of Respondent. That adjustment is
accounted for with regard to alimony mentioned below.
Respondent's award of the guns and ammunition shall ho subject to thr Oder of
the Criminal Court or any subsequent amendment.
9
ALIMONY: Though both Parties are currently receiving Social Security Benefits,
there is still a disparity of income as mentioned above. Petitioner is in need of income
above her current allotment. Respondent is also in need of more than his allotment. It
is equitable however, for their incomes to be equalized so that they are placed on an
even footing though that will still leave each short of meeting their needs. It may be,
that they will have to find some kind of employment or sell some of their assets in order
to make do. In any event, it is equitable for Respondent to pay Petitioner alimony in the
sum of $251 per month. That amount results from the average of the two SS payments
and adjusting the alimony so that the income of each Party is equal. However, the
Court concludes that there should be no alimony obligation on the part of Respondent
the result of which off-sets Respondent's right to receive payment for the balance of his
personal injury funds in the amount of $20,326 which Petitioner is taking as part of the
equity in the marital residence
10.
DEBTS AND OBLI 3 I Il Df IS Each of the Parties are to be responsible for tl In
own indebtedness and to hold the other harmless thereon. There was no testimony as
to indebtedness presented at trial except for each Parties, medical bills which they are
to pay.
11
MAIDEN NAME: Petitioner may be restored to her maiden-name if she chooses.
The request was made by her counsel in the opening statement but no testimony as to
the maiden name was presented at trial. The name may be inserted in the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and in the Decree of Divorce if appropriate.
12
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS: Each of the Parties are to be responsible for
their own Attorney's Fees and Costs of Court.
13.
RESTRAINING ORDER: Each Party is restrained from harassing, abusing or
threatening the other. A Police Officer is to be present when Respondent's personal
property currently stored at Petitioner's residence is picked up Respondent's designee
is to remove all of Respondent's property at Petitioner's residence within 30 days
following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in that Respondent has been Ordered to
stay away from Petitioner's home in the Order of the Criminal Coi irt

8
14.
COOPERATION: Each of the Parties are to cooperate in the execution of any
documents necessary to finalize all aspects of the Decree of Divorce to be issued in
this matter.
15.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: The Court requests counsel for Petitioner to
prepare final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. The
pleadings are to be prepared and reviewed by both counsel in accordance with Rule
4-504, Code of Judicial Administration, and then submitted to the Court for review and
signature.
DATED this ^ b # - d a v of October, 1998.

"VE COURT^
Darwin C. Hansen - Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed the Memorandum Decision, postage pre-paid, first
class U.S. mail, to the following:
Emilie A. Bean
Attorney for Petitioner
190 South Fort Lane, #2
Layton, UT 84041

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 480
Draper, UT 84020

DATED this $Ctfi. day of October, 1998.

Deputy Court Clerk

1
2
3
4

Steven C. Tycksen (3300)
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.C.
Attorney for Respondent
Post Office Box 480
Draper, Utah 84020-0480
Telephone: (801) 572-2700
Facsimile: (801) 553-1618
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

7
8

LOUISE A. SYMES,

9

Petitioner,

MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS

10

vs.

11

MERLIN DAVID SYMES,

12

Respondent

r
c o
Case No.-£74902275
Judge: Darwin C. Hansen

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

COMES NOW, Respondent, Merlin David Symes, by and through counsel Slew
Tycksen, arid liereb) mo i es this C :>i III: I: t :> \ ssess Costs Incurred by the Respondent for thand the expert, 'witnesses as listed in the attached Exhibit ' \ as costs against:: .
AS GROUNDS THEREFORE, Respondent states and. alleges as follows:
I

I In1 i nut r H r d upon mil ni»rd this pvirlcmT in rinking its decision, and the costs to

procuCL UK, same should thereiorc app,

:,ea a~ &:\ expt;^-.

division of assets.

21
22

DATED and yiifMl;

this/ c> an „ "

23
24
25
26
27
28

StevffirrC. Tycksen
Attorney for Respondent

esiluili" pi ni iii I J Mi i'

1
2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a

3 I correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid, to the following:
4..
Emile Bean
5 || BEAN & SMEDLEY
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
6 || Layton, UT 84041
7 li on this ' J day of November, 1998.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

/

/-/C~\

EXHIBIT 'A'

Colleen Olson (doll Appraisals)
Ardell Brown (Zimmer Appraisal)
Derek Lamb (Layton Home Appraisal)
W.R. Peterson (Bear Lake Appraisal
Payne Anthony Jewlers (Jewelry Appraisal)

$750.00
$200.00
$510.00
$575.00
$350.00

TOTAL

$2385.00

1 Steven C. Tycksen (3300)
/.£•.•

Attorney for Defendant
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.C.
3 Post Office Box 480
Draper, Utah 84020-0480
4
Telephone: (801) 572-2700
5 Facsimile: (801) 553-1618
2
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY

7

LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10 LOUISE A. SYMES,
11

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO RE-CONSIDER COURTS
RULING AND/OR RE- OPEN TRIAL TO TAKE
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE

12
13

vs.

14 MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
15

Defendant.

Civil No. 974702275
Judge Rodney S. Page

16
17

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through counsel, Steven C. Tycksen, and does hereby

18 move this Court to re-consider its ruling on a few issues and/or re-open the trial to take additional
19 testimony. The issues that need to be re-addressed are as follows:
20
21

1.

The Court found that there was not an adequate accounting of what happened to the

money which the parties received from the sale of the St. George property. The Court assumed and

22 concluded that the money was not spent for marital purposes and still exists. Because of this assumption
23 the Court ordered the unaccounted for money divided equally. In the Defendant's testimony at trial he
24 indicated that he had no hoard or stash of money left overfromthe sale of the property, that he gave half
25

of the last installment to Plaintiff, and that he had spent the other portion of the money on marital

26 expenses. The Defendant did not anticipate that this issue would require further documentation because
27 it was never raised in the pleadings and was not addressed in the Pre-Trial order as an issue for Trial.
28

1

1

He "¥v as tl lei efoi s n :: 1: pi epai ed to demonstrate v

•. documentation to

2

otherwise he would ha\ e produced Ms banking records M *eover, the documentation he would have

3

needed to do so was not available to him. because all of his financial records were in Plaintiffs possession

4

and still! iiii

5

having failed to document his testimony under these circumstances. The Defendant should therefore be

6

allowed access to his personal financial records in Plaintiffs possession or be given an opportun ity to

7

request (I'linm ti

8

funds were distributee:

9

all of these fiinds were
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* •. sieves these records will demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that
W

purposes Defendant asks the Court to be allowed to present this

10

evider

11

and change it's ruling on this issue in view of his statements to the contrary. As a comparative coi ollary

12

to this the Defendant never knew that his wife had been receiving "Social Security" income during the

14

i eceiving it for several years His testimony was that he used his resources to support the 'family I le

15

gave hei money to live on and paid the family bills. He did not know she had othei income. 1 \llo

18

should also be required to be explain and document the disposition of these marital fiinds or they should

19

be divided equally in fairness to both parties

2

-

..

x ;.-

mi he Defendant asks the Court; to re-open the trial to alio a him to provide evidence of the

21 | vaiue of the Bear Lake Cabin at the time of the parties marriage. I'he appraiser who appraised the
22
23"

property and te<t:f ed a1 fnal was not prepared to cive an opinion ^~ *Ur> value of th* cabin at ih
,_

•

.i name ant

4

-~?

i::. .. . JCL ., _

24

it as a marital asset. The only issue Defendant believed was properly before the Court was the value of

25

the additions or modifications and this was the evidence Defendant presented,, The Defendant presented

27 I the Defendant's sons. I he Court chose not to rely on this ei idence and instead speculated on the value
28

1

of the Cabin at the time of the parties marriage by assuming mat me appreciation of the cabin was the

2

same as the appreciation of the land. There was no evidence provided by either party at trial to support

3

that assumption. Since the Court's ruling the Defendant has requested the appraiser to form that opinion

4

and he further believes that the Plaintiff is in possession of other of his financial records which can

5

demonstrate the value of the Cabin at the time of the parties marriage in a more accurate fashion. This

6

evidence was not available to him at trial because all of hisfinancialrecords were in Plaintiffs possession

7

and she refused to turn over Defendant's property. The Defendant therefore asks the Court to allow this

8

additional evidence to be provided and considered by the Court in a re-opened trial or evidentiary hearing

9

and/or asks the Court to allow Defendant to submit this information to the Court by Affidavit and have

10
11

the Court reconsider its ruling on this matter.
3.

The Court failed to make any division of personal property in its ruling but suggested that

12

the parties should work it out. This ruling ignores the history of this case and the repeated difficulty

13

Defendant has had in obtaining any of his property. Without specific guidance from the Court the present

14

ruling leaves the parties right where they have been, unable to agree on anything. Defendant respectfully

15

requests the Court to reconsider its ruling and make specific awards of property and definite orders for

16

how and when the Defendant may pick up his property.

17

4.

The Court specifically ordered that the parties each pay their own attorney fees and costs.

18

However, Defendant incurred substantial costs and witness fees which should appropriately be ordered

19

to be taxed as expenses of the marital estate. The Defendant spent nearly $4,000.00 in witness fees and

20

appraisals. The Court relied heavily upon and used this evidence in making its ruling. As such, the costs

21

incurred to provide this evidence created a benefit to both parties and the Court should therefore

22

appropriately tax these costs as an expense of the marital estate and not solely to the Defendant.

23

Defendant Respectfully requests the Court to reconsider this part of its ruling.

24

DATED and SIGNED this 2 ^ d a y of November, 1!

25
26 I
27"
28

SfeVeft C. Tycksen
Attorney for Defendant

1
2
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a true
5 II and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid to the following:
6 || Emilie Bean
BEAN & SMEDLEY
7 || 190 South Fort Lane,
Layton, Utah 84041
8

9 || on this ££_ day of November, 1998.
10
11
12
1
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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25
26
27
28
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BEAN & SMEDLEY
Emilie A. Bean (6178)
Attorney for Plaintiff
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, UT 84041
Telephone: (801) 544-4221
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE A. SYMES,
Petitioner,
vs.
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Respondent.

:
:
:

RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO ASSESS COSTS

:
:
:

Civil No. 9747 02275

:

Petitioner, Louise A. Symes, objects to respondent's Motion
to Assess Costs on the following grounds:
1.

Respondent knew or should have know that he was

incurring costs for appraisals and testimony which would not
necessarily be divided as part of the marital estate expenses.
Presumably, respondent hoped that the Court would rely on his
expert witnesses, reports, and testimony.
2.

Had petitioner been able to afford appraisals, she would

also have had her own expert testimony; however, based on the
objection by respondent to cashing out a life insurance policy
that was actually loosing value, petitioner was unable to afford
her own experts and should not be responsible for any portion of
the payments respondent must make to his expert witnesses.
3.

The Court's Memorandum Decision did not award respondent

his expenses although respondent made the request at trial. The

Judge chose no! !o award costs as requested by respondent ~:i * '.*•
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BEAN & SMEDLEY
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EMILIE A. BEAN
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 3**day of December, 1998,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, PO
Box 480, Draper, Utah 84020-0480, postage prepaid.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE A. SYMES,
Petitioner,
vs.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER COURT'S RULING
AND/OR REOPEN TRIAL TO TAKE
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY AND
EVIDENCE

MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Civil No. 9747 02275
Respondent.

Petitioner, Louise A. Symes, by and through her counsel of
record, hereby responds to respondent's Motion to Reconsider
Court's Ruling and/or Reopen Trial to take Additional Testimony and
Evidence, and objects to the Motion on the following grounds:
1.

The Court had a trial on this matter which exceeded the

scheduled time estimated by counsel by one full day, at which time
respondent had sufficient opportunity to present any relevant
evidence he deemed appropriate.

All of the claims made by

respondent requesting new evidence are subject matter which
respondent could have or should have anticipated would be at issue
at trial.
2.

Specifically, respondent complains that the Court's

decision with regard to the issue of division of the St. George

2
property did not account for respondent's claim that the funds were
spent for marital purposes.

Respondent fails to consider that

petitioner sent discovery on August 12, 1998 requesting not only
information and documentation with regard to the St. George
property, but also respondent's bank records.

In answer to

discovery not only should respondent have recognized the issue of
division of the St. George property, but also respondent's
documentation could have and should have been prepared in answer to
discovery.

Petitioner received the answers to discovery after

lunch on the first day of trial with no actual production of the
documents requested.
3.

The Court heard ample evidence as to the lifestyle of the

parties and the separation of their assets into entirely different
bank accounts during the course of the marriage and therefore had
sufficient grounds to conclude as a matter of law that petitioner
did not receive her one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the St.
George property.

In addition, respondent fails to take into

account that petitioner was a title holder on the property and was
in her own right entitled to one-half of the parties' proceeds from
sale to be used as she directed and not at respondent's whim.
4.

The Court considered the best evidence possible for

valuation of the Bear Lake property at the time of the marriage.
Even though detrimental to petitioner's position, the Court took
the only logical approach on the valuation of the property as
compared to tax notices.

The Court used respondent's own appraiser

to determine the percentage markup from the tax notice.

On that

basis, petitioner, who could not afford to do an appraisal, may
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have taken any loss in the current market value if the appraiser
favored his own client; however, in so figuring the Court then put
the onus of any loss for a low appraisal on respondent for
valuation at the time of marriage.

Respondent's attorney requested

that the Court evaluate the property on the percentage basis and
respondent is now arguing against the request of his counsel in
closing arguments.

In addition, the Court determined that the

improvements made by the parties during the course of the marriage
were improvements made as part of the marriage and the source of
the improvements or the funds were irrelevant.
determination is squarely within the law.

The Court's

Respondent's children's

testimony was self-serving with regard to improvements of the
property and the sale of the adjacent property.

The Court gave

respondent's children the benefit of the adjacent property even
though logically, given the length of time that had passed before
the deed was recorded, it was likely held as a "dresser drawer"
deed for inheritance purposes by respondent, and the Court would
not have been beyond its discretion to consider the adjacent
property as marital.
5.
property.

The Court did not fail to make a division of personal
The Court simply indicated that the parties should

follow the lists provided as exhibits to the Court which the Court
observed were largely consistent.

For any inconsistencies, the

Court made provision for dispute resolution.
6.

Respondent repeats his Motion for appraisal and witness

fees in his Motion for Reconsideration which is the subject of
respondent's prior Motion to Assess Costs.

Petitioner cannot
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expend attorney's fees in repeatedly answering the same issues and
would request that the issue of payment of witness fees and
appraisal costs be considered only as part of respondent's previous
Motion or that the Court consider petitioner's attached Response to
respondent's prior Motion as sufficient answer to this request.
7.

Petitioner is without sufficient funds to continually

respond to respondent's post trial motions particularly where they
are not grounded in law and are merely respondent's attempts to
gain position greater than originally granted by the Court.
Divorce courts are courts of equity leaving the judge with broad
discretion as to accommodation in one area to equalize
circumstances in another.

Respondent would have the Court maintain

its rulings with regard to all matters beneficial to him but deny
equity to petitioner for any portion of the Court's ruling which
may have benefited petitioner's position.
WHEREFORE, petitioner requests that the Court deny
respondent's Motion, and further that petitioner be granted $135.00
in attorney's fees for having to answer a second and partially
redundant post trial Motion.
DATED this

/(o^

day of December, 1998.
BEAN & SMEDLEY

BEAN
EMILIE A.. BEAN
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
/^-^-day of December, 1998, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Motion
to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, Lone Peak Law Offices, PO
Box 480, Draper UT 84020-0480, postage prepaid.
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BEAN & SMEDLEY
Emilie A. Bean (6178)
Attorney for Plaintiff
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, UT 84041
Telephone: (801) 544-4221
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT/ STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE A. SYMES,
Petitioner,

:
:
:

RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO ASSESS COSTS

i

VS •

MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Respondent.

:
:

Civil No. 9747 02275

:

Petitioner, Louise A. Symes, objects to respondent's Motion
to Assess Costs on the following grounds:
1.

Respondent knew or should have know that he was

incurring costs for appraisals and testimony which would not
necessarily be divided as part of the marital estate expenses.
Presumably, respondent hoped that the Court would rely on his
expert witnesses, reports, and testimony.
2.

Had petitioner been able to afford appraisals, she would

also have had her own expert testimony; however, based on the
objection by respondent to cashing out a life insurance policy
that was actually loosing value, petitioner was unable to afford
her own experts and should not be responsible for any portion of
the payments respondent must make to his expert witnesses.
3.

The Court's Memorandum Decision did not award respondent

his expenses although respondent made the request at trial.

The

2
Judge chose not to award costs as requested by respondent in the
Memorandum Decision.

Asking again merely wastes petitioner's

resources and having to respond to respondent's Motion.
4.

Petitioner did not have evidence to the contrary with

regard to the appraised values of the martial residence and the
Bear Lake cabin property, and petitioner's doll collection, and
therefore was unable to argue those specific values.

Petitioner

believed that respondent's appraisals with regard to the jewelry
and vehicles were so grossly inaccurate, a contrary appraisal was
not even necessary to refute those claims.
THEREFORE, petitioner objects to any requirement to share
costs in the appraisals obtained by respondent for his selfserving purpose and not as universal information to provide to
the Court and requests that respondent be ordered to pay
petitioner's attorney's fees in the amount of $132.00 for
responding to respondent's frivolous motion.
DATED this

day of December, 1998.
BEAN & SMEDLEY

EMILIE A. BEAN
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of December, 1998,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, PO
Box 480, Draper, Utah 84020-0480, postage prepaid.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
SAKMINGTONDEPARTMENT, ST AXEOFUTAH

LOUISE A.SYMES,
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO RE-CONSIDER OR RE-OPEN
FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,

Case No. 974702275 DA
Defendant. | Judge Darwin C. Hansen

The above matter came on for hearing pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Re-Consider or ReOpen for Additional Testimony. After reviewing the Court's Memorandum Decision and notes taken
during the trial and the content of Defendant's motion, it is the Ruling of the Court that Defendant's
Motion should be denied based upon Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (1980), with the exception of
the issue regarding the distribution of personal property. As to that issue, the Court will take
additional testimony. Counsel are directed to confer and identify those items which are in conflict
and those for which there is agreement. The clerk will call counsel and arrange for a hearing date.
Counsel is requested to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit the same to
the Court for signature and entry.

A

DATED this %<? day of December, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

DARWIN C
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed the Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Re-Consider or Re-Open
For Additional Evidence, postage pre-paid, first-class mail, to the following:
Emilie A. Bean
Attorney for Petitioner
190 South Fort Lane, #2
Layton, UT 84041
DATED this

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 480
Draper, UT 84020-0480

/((? day of December, 1998.

Deputy Court Clerk

2

2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE A. SYMES,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
HEARING

vs.

Case No: 974702275 DA

MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DARWIN C. HANSEN
February 19, 1999

Clerk:
glendap
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): EMILIE A BEAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEVEN C. TYCKSEN

HEARING
Attorney Tycksen is present by telephone and Attorney Bean is
present in chambers. This hearing is continued to 3/23/99 at 4:00
p.m. Counsel agree that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and the Divorce Decree get signed today.
Court signs the Findings and the Decree.
Dated this ^ ^ 2 day of

Jh^J?.

.

19/7.

EN C. HANS]
District Court Judge

Page 1 (last)

1 Steven C. Tycksen (.^00)
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.G
2
Attorney for Defendant
3 Post Office Box 480
Draper, Utah 84020-0480
4
Telephone (801) 572-2700
5 Facsimile (801) 553-1618
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DAVIS COUNTY—

7
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10 LOUISE A. SYMES,
11
12
13

Plaintiff,
vs.

MERLIN DAVID SYMES,

14
15

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendant.

Civil No. 974702275
Judge Darwin C. Hansen

16
17

Notice is hereby given that the Defendant/Appellant above named, hereby appeals to the Supren

18 Court of the State of Utahfromthose certain judgment of the Second District Court in and for Dav
19 County, Layton Department, State of Utah, dated and entered on February 19, 1999.
20
21

DATED and SIGNED this /$

day of March, 1999.

22
23
24'
25
26
27
28

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

1
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a true
3
and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid to the following:
4..
Emilee Bean
5 || BEAN & SMEDLEY
190 S. Fort Lane, Suite 2
6 II Layton, UT 84041

71
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

ffatAck
on this JjjL day oHPebrttary, 1999.
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1 Steven C. Tycksen (3300)
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Lone Peak Law Offices, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
3 Post Office Box 480
Draper, Utah 84020-0480
4
Telephone (801) 572-2700
5 Facsimile (801) 553-1618
2
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DAVIS COUNTY

7

LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10 LOUISE A. SYMES,
11
12
13

Plaintiff,
vs.

MERLIN DAVID SYMES,

14
15

NOTICE OF FILING COST BOND

Defendant.

Civil No. 974702275
Judge Darwin C. Hansen

16
17

Notice is hereby given that the Defendant/Appellant above named, hasfiledherewith a cost bond

18 of $300.00 in conjunction with the Notice of Appealfiledconcurrently herewith.
19
20

DATED and SIGNED this 15

day of March, 1999

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

SteveaO Tycksen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2

I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a true

3

and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid to the following:

4 II Emilee Bean
BEAN & SMEDLEY
5|| 190 S. Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, UT 84041
6 ;;
7 on this lw day orFebrtwwy, 1999.
8

9
10
11
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LOUISE A. SYMES,
Plaintiff,

— -

vs.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Defendant.
Case No. 974702275

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the original Notice of Appeal was
sent to:
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84II4-0230
Kris Lair/Joanne Pratt
Second District Court
Farmington, Utah 84025

Dated this 18th day of March, 1999.
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